COMMENT
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1981
During 1981, the fifteenth year of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),1 decisions from the courts of appeals dominated the Act's
interpretative landscape 2 in a continuing attempt to reconcile the
FOIA's "general philosophy of full agency disclosure ' 3 with the
competing desire for secrecy and confidentiality in government. The

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit retained its
preeminence as a FOIA tribunal, 4 issuing significant decisions on six of
the Act's nine exemptions. 5 The Courts of Appeals for the First and

Third Circuits joined the District of Columbia judges in refining the
FOIA's "personal privacy" exemptions.6 In the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, the central dispute in a long-running Exemption 3
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The scheme of the Act is fairly simple: government agencies must
disclose all records held by them through publication, open files, or individual responses to
specific requests, unless the records fall within one of nine specific exemptions.
2. The Supreme Court issued one decision in 1981 concerning the FOIA, Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981), but did not significantly
reinterpret any provision of the Act. See text accompanying notes 75-85 infra.
3. S. Rap. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
4. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decides a large number of
FOIA cases because the Act provides that venue properly lies "in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are
situated [most likely the District of Columbia], or in the District of Columbia." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(B) (1976).
5. The court addressed Exemption 1, which permits agencies to withhold certain records to
protect national security, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976), see text accompanying notes 37-87 infra;
Exemption 2, which applies to internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(2) (1976), see text accompanying notes 88-110 infra; Exemption 4, which concerns trade
secrets and confidential or privileged business data, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976), see text
accompanying notes 124-25 infra; Exemption 5, which covers intra-agency memoranda, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (1976), see text accompanying notes 161-85 infra; Exemption 6, which concerns
invasions of personal privacy, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976), see text accompanying notes 196-201
infra; and Exemption 7, subpart (C) of which concerns invasions of personal privacy in law
enforcement and national security investigatory records, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C) (1976), see text
accompanying notes 216-25 infra.
6. Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See text accompanying notes 192-95, 205-15 infra.

DUKE L4WJOURX4L

[Vol. 1982:423

suit7 ended when the Reagan administration's Economic Tax Recovery

Act of 19818 amended the Internal Revenue Code provision in
question. 9
The nonjudicial branches of the federal government were active as

well. The Attorney General issued an important policy letter on the
FOIA.1 0 The Securities and Exchange Commission considered (but
failed to pursue) a clever redefinition of "agency records" which would

have prevented certain disclosures from its files. I Legislative
initiatives supported by President Reagan threatened drastic changes in
the FOIA,1 2 but by the end of 1981 the only real changes had come
3
through continuing judicial refinement of the Act's scope.1

7. Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and
remanded, 102 S.Ct. 468 (1981). Exemption 3 permits withholdings authorized by other federal
statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1976).
8. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 701, 95 Stat. 340 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 6103(b)).
9. I.R.C. § 6103 (1976).
10. See text accompanying notes 17-19 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 29-36 infra discussing proposed regulation § 240.24a-1.
12. See notes 20, 24-27 and text accompanying notes 20-27 infra. The Supreme Court may
also play a greater role in 1982 developments, having granted review in five FOIA cases during
1981: Shapiro v. Klutznick, 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub nom. Baldridge v.
Shapiro, 451 U.S. 936 (1981) (disclosure of census information-Exemption 3); McNichols v.
Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsubnom. McNichols v. Baldridge, 452 U.S.
937 (1981) (disclosure of census information-Exemption 3); Abramson v. FBI, 658 F.2d 806
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted,452 U.S. 937 (1981) (withholding of FBI records under Exemption
7(c) when such records were not compiled for investigatory purposes); Washington Post Co. v.
United States Dep't of State, 647 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 565 (1981)
(Exemption 6) (see text accompanying notes 196-201 infra); Bureau of Economic Analysis v.
Long, 646 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1981), vacatedand remanded, 102 S.Ct. 468 (1981) (I.R.C. § 6103
and Exemption 3) (see text accompanying notes 143-59 infra). Early in 1982, the court decided
MeNichols and Shapiro, holding that census information was exempt under the FOIA, see 102 S.
Ct. 1103 (1982), and agreed to hear a sixth case, Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World
Christianity v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1249 (1982)
(Exemptions 1 and 3).
Somewhat later, as this comment went to press, the Court decided the Washington Post case.
See 50 U.S.L.W. 4522 (U.S. May 17, 1982). The case is discussed in note 201 infra. The Court
also reversed Abramson. See 50 U.S.L.W. 4530 (U.S. May 24, 1982).
13. For a discussion of developments under the FOIA in prior years, see Comment,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1980, 1981 DUKE L.J. 338; Comment,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1979, 1980 DUKE L.J. 139; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366; Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416; Comment,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; Note,
Developments Under the FreedomofInformationAct-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, Federal
AdministrativeLaw Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, 136; Project, FederalAdministrative
Law Developments-1970, 1971 DUKE LJ. 149, 164; Project, Federal Administrative Law
Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE LJ. 67, 72.
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I.

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE COURTS

Because the Department of Justice exercises primary responsibility
for the defense of any FOIA suit against an agency, its policy guides
agencies in their decisions to withhold or release information requested
under the Act. In the first year of the Carter administration, Attorney
General Griffin Bell issued to all federal departments and agencies a

letter favoring "the spirit, appearance, and reality of open govern-

ment."' 14 The Bell letter set out four criteria the Department of Justice
would consider in determining whether to defend a suit:
(a) Whether the agency's denial seems to have a substantial legal
basis,
(b) Whether defense of the agency's denial involves an acceptable
risk of adverse impact on other agencies,
(c) Whether there is a sufficient prospect of actual harm to legitimate
public or private interests if access to the requested records were to
be granted to justify the defense of the suit, and
(d) Whether there is sufficient information about the controversy to
support a reasonable judgment that the agency's denial merits defense under the three preceeding critiera. 15
Criterion (c) encouraged disclosure for borderline requests 16 because
absent some showing of prospective harm, the Department of Justice

would not undertake a defense of an agency's withholding.
Four years later, under President Reagan, Attorney General Wil-

liam French Smith abolished criterion (c).17 The Department of Justice will now defend all FOIA suits having a substantial legal basis
"without requiring the agency to show that demonstrable harm could

result" 8 from disclosure. This new stance permits the agencies to formulate more restrictive internal policies toward disclosure requests

without forfeiting their practical opportunity for representation in the
courts. 19
14. Letter from Attorney General Griffin B. Bell to Heads of All Federal Departments and
Agencies (May 5, 1977) (released by the Department of Justice May 11, 1977), refprintedin THE
1981 EDITION OF LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY AcT, app. 56-57 (6th ed. C. Marwick 1980).
15. Id. at 57.
16. For a contrary view, see note 19 infra (guidelines were, perhaps, never heeded).
17. See Letter of Attorney General William French Smith to All Federal Departments and
Agencies (May 5, 1981).
18. Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults before the Second Circuit
Judicial Conference, "The Freedom of Information Act-Is it Working Correctly?" (May 9, 1981)
(published as Department of Justice No. DOJ-1981-05).
19. Mark Lynch, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, claims that the new
policy suggests the Department of Justice will simply cater to the whims of its clientele (the agencies). Coles and Picard, Freedom of InformationAct Comes Under Fire as Misused Law; Offcials
CallForLegislativeRevision, Fol DIGEST, May-June 1981 at 4. Jack Landau, Executive Director
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Attorney General Smith's letter accurately represents the Reagan
administration's 1981 attitude toward the FOIA. The administration's

legislative initiatives, such as a comprehensive amendments proposal,
S. 1751,20 also indicate a desire to restrict disclosures. The version of

this bill incorporated in S. 173021 and approved by the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution would create two new exemptions:

one for government-generated legal settlement records 22 and another
for technical data restricted from export.23 More importantly, S. 1730
would also expand the coverage of Exemption 2,24 Exemption 4,25 and
of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, contends that the new guidelines "will send
a clear message to all government agencies---'When in doubt, keep it secret,' 'Use every technicality to suppress information' and 'Lean over backward against the free flow of news."' Id. But
some evidence indicates that the old Bell guidelines were not successful in encouraging more
disclosures: within seven months of their issuance, the FOIA caseload for the Department of
Justice increased from 600 to 1,100 cases. Id.
The same day Smith's memorandum appeared, Representative Fortney Stark introduced legislation that would, in effect, block the new policy by enacting the Bell standards as positive law.
See H.R. 3412, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
20. 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Reagan administration also planned to introduce proposals to exempt the CIA from the FOIA, a step urged by the Director of the CIA, William J.
Casey. Casey alleged that the CIA has unintentionally released "sensitive intelligence information" when complying with FOIA requests, and that the CIA data provided to other agencies has
caused FOIA disclosures constituting "serious compromises of classified information." 1981 N.Y.
Times News Service. For a summary of other legislative proposals on the FOIA not initiated by
the President's staff, see Weiss, Security, Police Work CitedBy CriticsSeeking to Limit Freedom of
InformationAct, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1243, 1246 (1981) (summarizing S. 587, S. 1235, S.
1247, S. 1273, H.R. 2021). Two of these bills, S. 1235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and S. 1273,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), substantially exempt the CIA from the FOIA by greatly expanding
the types of CIA files that may be withheld under the Act.
21. Senator Orrin Hatch chairs the Subcommittee. His own FOIA amendments bill, S. 1730,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rc. 511, 296 (1981) constituted the other major working proposal for changing the Act and influenced the final form of S. 1751. Hatch made it known he intended to "combine the best of both bills" during their mark-up in committee. See Weiss,
Questions Posed Concerning ReaganProposalto RestrictFreedomof Information Act, 39 CoNG. Q.
WEEKLY RaP. 2077, 2077 (1981).
22. S. 1730, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 12 (1981). Cf. County of Madison v. Department of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036, 1041 (Ist Cir. 1981) (no equitable "settlement exemption" implied in the

FOIA).
23. S. 1730, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 12 (1981).
24. See id. § 8. Exemption 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1976), currently permits withholding of
matters "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." Some courts
interpret this exemption to extend beyond mere "housekeeping" information to investigatory and
training manuals. See, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) discussed at text accompanying notes 90-110 infra. The Reagan-Hatch
bill would codify this judicial interpretation for "such materials as (A) manuals and instructions to
investigators, inspectors, auditors and negotiators" and would also extend protection to materials
used for determining qualifications of employment, promotion, or licensing of individuals.
25. See S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 5, 9 (1981). Exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1976), currently protects confidential "trade secrets and commercial or financial information"
from mandatory disclosure. Courts have interpreted this provision to require a showing that disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the submitter. See text
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Exemption 7,26 but restrict judicial review under Exemption 1 to an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.2 7
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took a subtler
approach toward proscribing unwanted disclosures by proposing regulation 240.24a-1. 28 The proposed regulation would have excluded certain documents from disclosure through a narrow interpretation of the
phrase "agency records." The FOIA contemplates remedies only for
the withholding of "agency records. '2 9 Section 24a of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193430 defines "agency records" for the SEC as "all
applications, statements, reports, contracts, correspondence, notices,
and other documents filed with or otherwise obtained by the Commisaccompanying notes 128-42 infra. The Reagan-Hatch bill expands this concept by permitting the
withholding of information "the disclosure of which could impair the legitimate private competitive research,financial,or business interests of any person." S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9
(1981) (emphasis added). The bill also provides for regulations requiring a submitter of information to specify any data exempt under section 552(b)(4), requiring the agency to notify the submitter when any request is made for such designated material, and allowing the submitter to object to
any disclosure of the data. S. 1730, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4 (1981). Section 5 of the bill allows a
requester or submitter to intervene as of right in a suit for disclosure or nondisclosure by the other
party generally. Id. § 5. The Administrative Conference of the United States had considered a
comprehensive modification of Exemption 4, but in deference to the Reagan administration, returned its proposals to committee without action. See 50 U.S.L.W. 2371 (Dec. 22, 1981).
26. See S. 1730, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 11 (1981). Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976),
permits withholding of "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" under six
carefully limited circumstances. The Reagan-Hatch bill would extend Exemption 7 beyond "investigatory records" to any documents "compiled for law enforcement purposes" in circumstances
which are essentially expansions of the six current instances. Exclusions are specifically implied
for all terrorism, foreign intelligence, and organized-crime information. Confidential sources
would also receive greater protection. See S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(b) (1981). For a
discussion of Exemption 7(D), see note 217 infra.
27. See S. 1751, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 5(2) (1981). Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976),
covers "matters that are (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." The need for a legislative change of Exemption 1 is not obvious, given the extent to which courts already refuse to allow a full de novo
review of national security matters under the FOIA. See note 57 and text accompanying notes 5356, infra.
The Reagan-Hatch bill also allows agencies to charge requesters for the services of agency
personnel in searching their files for information, S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981); gives
agencies more flexible time limits in responding to requests, id. § 3; and prevents any requests for
information under the FOIA by or on behalf of a party in an ongoing lawsuit, id. § 14. As this
comment went to press, defenders of the FOIA in its present form had secured a major compromise in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The compromise protected much of Exemption 1 and
current access to foreign intelligence information, but still allowed additional restrictions on investigatory records. See The Washington Post, May 22, 1982, at A2, Col. 4.
28. SEC Proposed Rulemaking, Records Not Obtained by the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg.
15,178 (1981).
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976) ("the district court. . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records").
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(a) (1976).
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not filed with the SEC under requirement of

law or "otherwise obtained" by the SEC are not agency records and are
thus not within the FOIA.
To encourage voluntary submissions of data for its law enforcement activities, 32 the Commission proposed regulation 240.24a-1, reasoning as follows:
A "record" received by the Commission, other than in connection
with a filing with the Commission, shall not be considered to have
been "otherwise obtained" by the Commission, within the meaning
of section 24a of the [Securities Exchange] Act, 15 U.S.C. 78x(a), unless such record is used as an exhibit by the Commission or its staff in

the law enforcement activities of the Commmission

....

33

Thus, on receipt of documents not filed with the Commission, the SEC

could elect under proposed section 240.24a-1 to treat the information as
not "otherwise obtained" and thereby prevent its release under the
FOIA.3 4 Because nothing prevents other agencies from promulgating
similar regulations, 35 the fate of the SEC's proposed section 240.24a-1

could have had potential significance throughout the federal
36
government.
31. Id. The Supreme Court, in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 (1980), cited section
24(a) with approval as the standard for "agency records" in the SEC.
32. The SEC began this effort by promulgating a rule establishing procedures for treating
information as "confidential." See 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (1981). But comments received by the
Commission prompted consideration of additional regulations because "confidentiality" alone
does not ensure nondisclosure under Exemptions 4 and 7(D) of the FOIA. See SEC Proposed
Rulemaking, Records Not Obtained by the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,178, 15,179 (1981).
33. SEC Proposed Rulemaking, Records Not Obtained by the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg.
15,178, 15,180 (1981). For discussions of other approaches to defining "agency records," see Comment, "hat IsA Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom ofInformationAct'r ThresholdRequirement, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 408; Note, The Defnition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1979).
34. The rule may have evolved from language in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980):
"FOIA applies to records, which have been infact obtained, and not to records which merely
couldhave been obtained." Id. at 186 (emphasis in original).
35. Such promulgation would become especially likely if agencies take to heart Justice Brennan's complaint in Forsham that the Court has produced "no manageable standards of any kind"
for defining agency records. 445 U.S. at 189 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A similar kind of
control over disclosure is exercised by Congress. Congressional documents are not "agency
records" because Congress is not an agency, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976), but Congress can cause
documents to become available under the FOIA through a failure to designate them "congressional" when such documents have passed from exclusive congressional possession. See Holy
Spirit Ass'n v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1249 (1982).
Under the SEC's proposal, a failure to have a submitter hand over information voluntarily (instead of including it in a filing, for instance) would subject the information to FOIA requests.
36. The SEC has not actively pursued this rulemaking because of pending legislative activity
aimed at amending the FOIA. Courts have also shown some deference to Exemption 7 claims,
deference which seems to go against the requirements of the Act.
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I.

THE

NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION

Even though section 552(a)(4)(B) of the FOIA prescribes that "the
court shall determine the matter de novo... and the burden is on the
agency to sustain its actions" 37 when the agency's withholding of information is challenged, the statute's command sometimes goes unheeded
in Exemption 138 litigation. Three recent national security cases illus40
trate this assertion: Phillippiv. C4,39 MilitaryAudit Project v. Casey,
and Stein v. Department of Justice.41 A fourth case, the only 1981
Supreme Court decision that sheds any light on the FOIA,42 indicates
the Court may have little patience with the delicate maneuvering

judges must undertake to comply fully with the spirit of the Act in Exemption 1 situations.
A. The Courts of 4ppeals Permita Lowered StandardofReview.
Phillippi and Military Audit Project, closely related suits in the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, involved requests for information about the Hughes Glomar Explorer incident of
the mid-1970s. 43 In both cases the court sustained CIA withholdings
based on combined Exemption 1 and 3 grounds 44 and granted sum37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (1976).
38. See note 27 supra for the text of Exemption 1.
39. 655 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
40. 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. 662 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
42. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981).
43. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 727-29 (D.C. Cir. 1981), describes the
background of the Hughes Glomar Explorer controversy. According to reports widely circulated
during 1975, the CIA had arranged with Howard Hughes for the construction of a huge floating
platform and submersible barge in order to raise a sunken Russian submarine from the sea floor.
The "cover story" for the GlomarExplorer protrayed the project as a daring engineering venture
into deep-sea manganese mining. After the Glomar Explorer recovered one-third of the submarine, a Hughes office in Los Angeles was mysteriously burglarized. Shortly thereafter the Los
Angeles Times published an incomplete, garbled account of the Glomar Explorer's efforts. The
CIA tried to suppress the story, with temporary success among the news media, but columnist
Jack Anderson breached the informal silence and circulated the story widely. Id.
44. Exemption 3 allows an agency to withhold information whenever such information is
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. . . provided that such statute (A) requires that
the matter be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld." 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1976). (The Phillopiand MilitaryAudit Project withholdings relied on the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) (1976).) Exemption 1, in similar fashion,
requires an Executive Order as a prerequisite to withholding. (The Phillippi and MilitaryAudit
Project courts relied on Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 compilation) (superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979)).)
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mary judgment for the government 45 on the basis of affidavits.
The MilitaryAudit Project court began its examination of agency

affidavits by reference to the legislative history of Exemption 1 (chiefly
a House-Senate conference report46) noting that:
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the Act ... makes
it clear that we "must recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have
unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result
of public disclosures of a particular classified record." We are there'47
fore required to "accord substantialweight to an agency's affidavit.
Reasoning from prior case law, 48 the court then determined that

agency affidavits warrant summary judgment if they: 1) describe in
reasonable detail the documents and justification for their withholding;
2) demonstrate that the withholding logically falls within the claimed
exemption; and 3) are not controverted, either by other evidence or by
indications of bad faith.49 Since the court decided that the affidavits in

both cases met these conditions, it affirmed the CIA withholdings.
The application of this general formula to the facts of cases like
Phillippiand MilitaryAudit Project reveals the difficulty of accomplish-

ing effective de novo review at trial without the active intervention of
the judge. Discovery may be limited or prevented altogether because
"[i]n national security cases, some sacrifice to the ideals of the full adversary process are inevitable.

5 0°

Furthermore, a denial of discovery

cannot constitute an abuse of trial court discretion when the movants
fail to raise "substantial.

.

. questions concerning the substantive con-

tent of the affidavits." 51 Thus if the public information to which the
information-seeker has access is insufficient to raise such "substantial
45. Military Audit Project v. Casey, No. 75-2103 (D.D.C. June 10, 1980), af'd, 656 F.2d 724
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillippi v. CIA, No. 75-1265 (D.D.C. June 9, 1980), a 'd, 655 F.2d 1325 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
46. See CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS, H.
R. REP. No. 93-1380 (S. REP. No. 93-1200 identical), 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 123 (1974), refprintedin
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 217.
47. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 738 n. 49, citing Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 641 F.2d 1328, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hayden v.
National Security Agency/Central Security Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weissman v.
CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
49. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d at 738.
50. Id. at 751, citing Hayden v. National Security Agency/Central Security Serv., 608 F.2d
1381, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 937 (1980). Cf. Shaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d
389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), (pre-amendments case granting discovery of classified information in an
Exemption 1 suit).
51. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d at 751.
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questions," he is in a "Catch-22" position.5 2 Unless the court also assumes the burden of ensuring de novo review, the agency need merely

its withholding decirecite a reasonable basis for exemption to justify
53
sion under section 552(a)(4)(B) of the FOIA.

The Military Audit Project panel refused to take such an active
role. Instead, Judge Malcolm Wilkey's opinion simply affirmed the

plausibility of each critical statement in the CIA affidavits.54 Although
Judge Wilkey claimed that it "is simply not so" that summary judgment on this basis represents a de facto substitution of a deferential

"reasonable basis" standard of review, 55 an inquiry restricted to the
plausibility of unchallengable agency affidavits seems indistinguishable

from a nonadversarial inquiry into the apparent reasonableness of a
secrecy classification. The court could at least have compared the affidavits' claims to the contents of the documents themselves. Yet the
MilitaryAudit Project and Philliopipanels stated that no56in camera inspection is required when the affidavits seem sufficient.
The holdings in MilitaryAudit Project and Phillppi,and in a similar case, Stein v. Department of Justice,57 defeat the spirit of the 1974
52. As Judge Mikva notes in his concurring opinion in Phillppi, "appellant is caught in a
Catch-22 inherent in the equivocal publicizing of legitimate intelligence operations." 655 F.2d at
1333 The problem is that:
if the purpose of the Glomar expedition was as described, official confirmation is unwarranted; if the reports are merely a fallback cover story, disclosure is even more unwarranted. This reasoning would not, of course, permit the CIA to withhold documents
concerning activities with no legitimate purpose merely by making a boilerplate allegation that they "might possibly involve a fallback story."
Id. The majority opinion implicitly recognized that these possible "fallback cover stories" are
unreliable sources for the requester in uncovering information to press his claims. Judge Wilkey
referred to such fabrications as "dis-information": "[w]ithout the ability to engineer controlled
leaks of dis-information, the CIA would be deprived of the ability to disseminate a fallback cover
while simultaneously protecting it." Id. at 1330.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
54. The language of the opinion reveals this, for example:
What should be obvious is that ifit is both plausible that the Glomar Explorer was
designed to mine the seabed and at the same time also plausible that the Glomer Explorer was designed to raise a Russian submarine, it is plausible that the Glomar Explorer was in fact designed to perform yet some still-secret third function. . . . The
affidavits supplied by the government provide an understandable and plausible basis for
the government's Exemption 1 claims.
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 at 744-45. References to plausibility appear several
other times, id at 737-38.
55. Id. at 751. See the discussion of the 1974 FOIA amendments' legislative history, text
accompanying notes 60-69 infra, for background on Congress's rejection of the reasonable-basis
standard.
56. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
57. 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981). Stein explicitly stated what the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions only implied:
Congress did not intend that the courts would make a true de novo review of classified
Rather, Congress intended that the courts would review the sufficiency
documents ....
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FOIA amendments. Those changes extended de novo review to Exemption 1 claims precisely because the Supreme Court's narrow decision in its first FOIA case, EPA v. Mink,5 8 prohibited in camera review
of classified documents. 59 The Senate version of the 1974 amendments
originally included a general de novo review provision, but limited Exemption 1 review to a "reasonable basis" standard.6 0 During floor de-

bate, an amendment by Senator Muskie deleted all reference to a
reasonable-basis standard in the Senate bill. 6 ' The House version, H.R.

12471,62 retaining de novo review for all FOIA exemptions, added only
a clause specifically allowing in camera examinations to counter the
restrictions imposed in Mink.6 3 Thus the House-Senate conference

committee received two bills specifying de novo review for all withholdings.6 4 Given this overwhelming rejection of a reasonable-basis

standard by both houses, collectively and individually, the language of
the bill as passed cannot support a reading of less than de novo review.

Furthermore, in his veto of the 1974 amendments, 65 President Ford
proposed a return to the original Senate version: "where classified doc-

uments are requested the courts could review the classification, but
would have to uphold the classification if there is a reasonable basis to
of the agency's affidavits and would require the agency to come forward with more information or with the documents themselves if the affidavits proved insufficient.
Id. at 1253. This conclusion was derived from the same short conference committee report passage relied on by the MilitaryAudit Project court. See CONFERENCE REPORT, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP.No. 93-1380 (identical to S. REP. No. 93-1200), 93d
Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT] reprintedin SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 3, at 229, cited in Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d at 1252. In Stein a lawyer
who represents Polish clients requested all documents concerning himself in FBI files. The FBI
withheld certain documents, relying in part on Exemption 1. The district court initially upheld the
agency's decision after an in camera examination, but reversed itself on a remand that had been
voluntarily sought by the agency and granted by the court of appeals following the disclosure of
much of the material sought. After its own in camera examination of the documents, the court of
appeals reversed the second decision of the district court and upheld the nondisclosure of the
remaining documents at issue. 662 F.2d at 1256 rn.5 & 6.
58. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
59. Id. at 84.
60. See S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974) (proposed section (4)(B)(ii)), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 189.
61. Senate Debate and Votes on S.2543, 120 CONG. REC. 17,022, 17,022-33 (1974) (amendment (No. 1356) of Sen. Muskie and debate), reprintedinSOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 302-28.
62. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprintedinSOURCE BOOK, supra note
3, at 145.
63. H.R. 12471 § (d), H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprinted/n SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 3, at 147.
64. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 64, reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at
225, which states that "[t]he conference substitute follows the Senate amendment. . . " Id. The
substitute, however, clearly incorporates language from both proposals.
65. Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC.
1318 (Oct. 17, 1974), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 481.
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support it."' 66 But again Congress passed the conference substitute specifying de novo review.67
The passage from the conference report relied on by MilitaryAudit
Project and Stein-that courts should give "substantial weight" to an
agency's affidavit 68-should be read in the context of Congress's continuing adherence to the requirement of de novo review. So read, the

passage does not restrict de novo review, but merely validates the govsuch review about possible
ernment's expert status in testifying6 during
9
adverse effects of public disclosure.
When a FOIA requester can obtain knowledge adequate to attack

these expert affidavits, in camera reviews seem unnecessary. But when
a court restricts a requester's ability to test the validity of government
affidavits, as in Military Audit Project, Phillppi, and Stein, the court
still bears the burden of de novo review. Consistent with that standard,
the court should perform an in camera inspection of the documents
70
referred to by the affidavits as provided for by Congress.
66. Id., reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 484.
67. Freedom of Information Act 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). Naturally, individual congressmen differed in their interpretations
of the provision for de novo review. Compare House Action and Vote on Presidential Veto, 120
CONG. REC. 36,622-24 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 403, 405-06 (provision not at odds with President Ford's conception of reasonable basis
review) with Senate Action and Vote on Presidential Veto, 120 CONG. REC. 36,865-69, 36,874-76
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, Sen. Baker, and Sen. Ervin), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 435-65 (provision completely different from President Ford's reasonable basis review).
As Senator Ervin wrote of the reasonable basis standard, repeating a previous speech in the debates: "is it not ridiculous to say that to find out what the truth is, one has to show whether the
agency reached the truth in a reasonable manner?" Id. at 36,876, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 3, at 464.
68. See note 57 supra.
69. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 32,601, reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3,
at 229 and in 120 CONG. REC. 32601 (1974). Once the government's submissions are properly
viewed as expert testimony, rather than as a mandate to reduce the standard of review, the 1974
amendment's explicit addition of in camera inspection to Exemption 1 procedure cannot be ignored. See also 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 383 (2d ed. 1978) (addition of
section 552(b) segregability requirement emphasizes the importance of in camera inspections).
70. The burden need not overwhelm the court. A judge can spot-check documents in camera
rather than read them in their entirety, though all the documents must be made available to him
on order. See Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3d Cir. 1981). Alternatively, the trial court can
appoint a special master to examine the documents. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). The Vaughn decision established the standard
practice of requiring a detailed affidavit index of documents to help relieve the burden on the
court of reading every document in FOIA litigation. As Judge Wilkey noted in Vaughn, the absence of such a procedure would "create a situation in which the Government need only carry its
burden of proof against a party that is effectively helpless and a court system that is never
designed to act in an adversary capacity." Id. at 826. The Vaughn court was trying to ensure the
integrity of de novo review when a court is overwhelmed by the number of possible documents at
issue. See id. at 828. Judge Wilkey's observations in Vaughn are equally applicable as an argu-

DUKE LAW JOUR[V,418

434

[Vol. 1982:423

At least one court agrees that inadequate knowledge of the contents of government documents may trigger in camera reviews in national security cases. In Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of
Energy,7 1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit drew the following distinction:
Courts in the future may find that exactly how they choose to exercise their de novo review role, and the desirability of in camera review, may turn on whether the agency's own interests, or third party
or important public interests, are at stake. Thus, a court faced with
. .Exemption 5 claims for internal agency memoranda might order
disclosure despite incomplete knowledge of the records involved,
since only the agency's vested interests are in issue . . . . But if
[there are potential]. . . adverse effects on third parties or national
security interests, then a court might resort to in camera review to
assure that72the documents were factually non-exempt before ordering
disclosure.
The CoastalStates Gas argument supported the government's defense
to summary judgment. It should apply equally to a plaintiff's request,
however; otherwise the government receives a procedural advantage
not provided under the FOIA. Thus, when a good-fiith plaintiff has no
chance to obtain the knowledge of the records needed to debate the
agency's exemption claims, the court should undertake an in camera
examination. 7 3 This minimal burden ensures a thorough de novo review, avoiding the shortcomings of MilitaryAuditProject,Phili&pli, and
Stein .74
*

ment for in camera review in the narrow situations presented him some eight years later when he
authored the Military 4udit Project andPhillippi opinions.
There is yet another reason for the use of in camera inspections after the 1974 amendments:
before 1974, yet after Mink, courts had granted discovery requests for the lassified contents of
.withheld documents in FOIA cases. See Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974):

"Facts respecting the classification of the reports in question are solely in the control of the State
Department. Appellant should be allowed to undertake discovery for the purpose of uncovering
facts which might prove his right of access to the documents.. . ." After the 1974 amendments,
courts became reluctant to grant discovery on this point. See text accompanying notes 50-51
supra. In camera inspection is the logical substitute.
71. 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 985 n.80 (emphasis in original).
73. The judiciary's aversion to in camera review may be more verbal than actual. In Stein,
for instance, although denying that a full de novo review was required, the appellate court nevertheless conducted its own in camera inspections of the documents sought. See note 57 supra.
Other recent examples of in camera review in national security cases include .Founding Church of
Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. National Security Administration, No. 80-1848 (D.C.
Cir. March 24, 1981) (in camera affidavits summarizing and excerpting documents), and Church
of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Turner, 662 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (full documents).
74. In particular, the courts could use a special master, as adverted to by Judge Wilkey in
Vaughn. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Some courts have expressed a fear
of handling sensitive documents themselves: "[O]ur own sense of inadequacy to provide the kind
of security such sensitive information requires strongly suggests that no one should be given access
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Indicationsthat the Supreme Court May Support A Lowered
Standardof Review.

In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/PeaceEducation Prothe Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit7 6 requiring the Navy to prepare for public release
a "Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement" concerning the possible impact of the storage of nuclear weapons at ammunition
magazines built in Hawaii. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held
that "[v]irtually all information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons is classified... exempt from disclosure under Exemption 1, and
therefore is exempt from the public disclosure requirements of
NEPA. ''77 Justice Rehnquist noted that if the Navy decided to store
nuclear material at the new magazines, Department of Defense regula-

ject75

preparation of an impact statement solely for intertions would require
78
nal agency use.
Justice Rehnquist went further, however, and noted that the
Navy's compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), when the Navy can neither admit nor deny storage for national security reasons, "is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case."' 79 To
support this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist cited not FOIA review procedures, but an 1875 case, Totten v. UnitedStates.8 0 The Totten Court

to such information who does not have a strong, demonstrated need for it." Colby v. Halperin,
656 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1981). If this is a valid concern, a special master with a security clearance
can no doubt be found. This method represents a compromise and should occur only infrequently. Yet in that narrow range of cases like MilitaryAudit Project, such a compromise is preferable to a complete abrogation of de novo review. Interestingly, as this note went to press the
District of Columbia Circuit, in an Exemption I case, reversed a lower court, remanding with
instructions to conduct an in camera examination of a classified affidavit and to compel the CIA to
answer interrogatories. See Andres v. CIA, 2 G.D.S. 82,184 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the case will not
be published).
75. 102 S.Ct. 197 (1981).
76. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1980), rev'dsub nom Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 102 S.Ct. 197
(1981).
77. 102 S.Ct. at 202. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1976), requires release of Environmental Impact Statements to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality, and the public, subject to the provisions of the FOIA. As the
Court noted, section 102(2)(C) of NEPA "contemplates that in a given situation a federal agency
might have to include environmental considerations in the decisionmaking process, yet withhold
public disclosure ...under the authority of a FOIA exemption." 102 S.Ct. at 201.
78. 102 S.Ct. at 203.
79. Id.
80. 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). Totten was an action to recover compensation under a secret
contract to perform spy services for the Union forces during the Civil War. The Court denied that
such actions could ever be maintained in the courts because "It]he publicity produced.., would
itself be a breach ...and thus defeat a recovery." Id. at 107.
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stated that "public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit ... the

trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not
allow the confidence to be violated." 8 1

A suit to determine whether or not the Navy complied with NEPA
in transferring weapons to the new magazines does not, however, "inevitably lead to disclosure" of confidential matters even if the Navy

cannot admit or deny the fact of weapons storage. As the concurring
opinion of Justice Blackmun notes, the primary purpose of NEPA is to
ensure that environmental concerns are given consideration in agency
planning activities.8 2 To this end, the FOIA review procedures, specifi-

cally the option of in camera review, permit a court to determine initially whether an agency has complied with NEPA and to consider
whether any of the nonclassified information can be segregated from

the classified information. Justice Blackmun identified the Totten reference as unnecessary dicta8 3 and focused on segregability 84 but did not
directly attack Justice Rehnquist's approach.85 Thus the entire Court
appears to favor avoiding the conflict between statutorily mandated de
novo review and the practical difficulties of military secrecy by leaving
86
such decisions to the agencies.

Though CatholicAction is not a FOIA case, and does not squarely
present the question of de novo review in national security cases, the

opinion indicates a potential unwillingness of the Court to pursue strict
compliance with the spirit of the 1974 amendments 87 of the FOIA. In
81. Id., cited in Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 102 S. Ct. at 203.
82. Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 102 S.Ct. 197, 204 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun never cited the FOIA's own provision on segregability, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
85. The passage quoted by Justice Rehnquist is not clearly the holding of Totten. The Totten
opinion cited the privileges of the confessional, the marriage, the lawyer-client relationship, and
the doctor-patient relationship as confidences that lawsuits cannot impair. It then noted: "Much
greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with
the government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed." 92
U.S. at 107 (1875). The emphasis is upon voluntary or contractual relationships. Because of this
emphasis, Totten is weak support for governmental nondisclosure in the face of a general statute
specifying disclosures (in this case, NEPA).
86. Although the FOIA provides for in camera inspection and commands de novo judicial
review, even Justice Blackmun seems to ignore a possible judicial role when he states: "ITIhe
military must determine whether the information at issue, consistent with the dictates of the relevant executive orders, can be released." 102 S.Ct. at 204 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The negative implication is that only the military can determine segregability.
87. The case of CIA v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 636 F.2d 838
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3641 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1982) may soon provide a definitive statement from the Court regarding the 1974 amendments. In the meanwhile, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in United States Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 50
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this respect, the Supreme Court's views comport with the 1981 Exemption 1 decisions from the courts of appeals.
III.

THE INTERNAL PERSONNEL RULES AND PRACTICES EXEMPTION

Until recently, a narrow interpretation of Exemption 28 prevailed
among the circuits. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and District of Columbia Circuits limited the exemption's application
to minor "housekeeping" records, which did not include such materials
as law enforcement manuals.8 9 Only the Second and Ninth Circuits
interpreted the provision broadly.9 0 But the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reversed its views
Exemption 2 in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcoand expanded the scope of
91
hol, Tobacco & Firearms.

In 1978, Michael Crooker, a federal prisoner,92 made a FOIA request for a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) training

manual on surveillance techniques. 93 The Bureau granted his request
in part, but claimed certain withholdings based interalia on Exemption

2. A district court, after inspecting the manual in camera, upheld the
Bureau's claim,94 but was reversed by the court of appeals. 95 On reU.S.L.W. 4522 (U.S. May 17, 1982), rev'g, 647 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1981) provides another example of the Court's trend toward less-than-rigorous readings of the Act's language. See note 201
inra.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)(1976). See note 24 supra for the language of Exemption 2.
89. See e.g., Cox v. Levi, 592 F.2d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1979); Jordan v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576
F.2d 1302, 1309-10 (8th Cir. 1978); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes
v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 1972).
90. See Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1980);
Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 1978). The Fifth
Circuit's position remains somewhat equivocal. It has not yet faced a case in which disclosure of a
government manual would risk circumvention of the law. Therefore, it has declined to choose
between its own position in Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973), and the position
taken in Caplan and Hardy. See Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1979), cited in
Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1070 n.50 (majority opinion),
1113 n.96 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
91. 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
92. Michael Crooker is also an experienced FOIA plaintiff. In Crooker v. United States
Dep't. of Justice, 632 F.2d 916 (Ist Cir. 1980), Crooker, after receiving materials describing the
role of federal prosecutors pursuant to a FOIA request, sought attorney fees for his pro se efforts.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a denial of this request, holding that such
awards are not authorized to pro se litigants under the FOIA. 632 F.2d at 920. The issues of both
pro se attorney's fees and attorney's fees generally under the FOIA are unresolved among the
circuits. See Comment, Pro Se Litigant's Ellgibilityfor Attorney Fees Under FOA: Crooker v.
United States Department ofaJustice, 55 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 520 (1981).
93. See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d at 1053.
94. See id. at 1055 (unreported order).
95. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 635 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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hearing en banc, however, a majority of the court held that, since the

manual "meets the test of 'predominant internality,' and since its disclosure significantly risks circumvention of federal statutes or regulations, the document is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 2."96
This holding departed from the court's decision in Jordan v. United
States Department of Justice,97 an Exemption 2 case involving guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in which the court had

held that "[e]xemption 2 was not designed to protect documents whose
disclosure might risk circumvention of agency regulation, whatever
would be the merits of such a provision."9 8

Unfortunately, for an opinion drastically altering the law of the
circuit, Crooker "muddles where it should illuminate." 99 The majority
opinion reviews the legislative history of Exemption 2 because "the

outcome of the case turns on congressional intent as expressed in the
legislative history."u ° But, implicitly concluding that the sparse legislative history alone is insufficient to interpret the exemption, 101 the
opinion also recites arguments concerning the language of the provision, 10 2 the results of similar cases in other circuits,1 0 3 and the factual

distinctions between Crooker and Jordan.10 4 More directly, though
Crooker is plausible, 0 5 the legislative history better supports a con-

trary position, 0 6 thus forcing the majority to recite other support for its
holding.
96. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d at 1053.
97. 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en bane).
98. Id. at 771.
99. 670 F.2d at 1092 (Ginsburg, J, concurring). Judge Ginsburg discussed the majority's
failure to reconcile Jordan with the new Crooker test.
100. Id. at 1058 n.15.
101. By the end of his opinion, Judge Edwards could only say "[t]o the extent that the legislative history underlying FOIA is helpful, it also supports our conclusion." Id. at 1073. Note that
the legislative history referred to is that of the FOIA in general, not of Exemption 2 specifically.
See note 105 infra.
102. Id. at 1066-68. See note 24 supra for the language of Exemption 2.
103. Id. at 1070-72.
104. Id. at 1074-75.
105. For example, the more important source for the legislative history of the exemption, S.
Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965), gives only a very brief and nonexclusive list of suggestions on its subject matter coverage, see note 106 infra, thus potentially allowing room for the
exemption to cover training manuals.
106. The chief sources of Exemption 2 history are the House and Senate reports, which state
that the provision applies "to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency: Operating
rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators. . . would be exempt
...but this exemption would not cover all 'matters of internal management such as employee
relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures.'" H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966); and "to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch
hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." S.REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1965). These passages appear contradictory. Furthermore, the House Report does not have the
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These other factors-reasonable inferences of Exemption 2's scope
derived from other decisions, the language of the exemption and the
FOIA as a whole-give the majority's position credence.107 The inference that the BATF manual falls within Exemption 2 is not clearly

unreasonable, and the skeletal legislative history cannot by itself deter10o
mine the meaning of the exemption.
But the court's failure to define
its new test of "predominant internality" casts doubt on the internal
consistency of its conclusion. 10 9
Judge Ginsburg's concurring opinion provides some guidance con-

cerning the court's possible future analysis. She distinguishes "secret
law," characteristic of the prosecutorial guidelines of Jordan, from the

absence of "secret law," characteristic of "predominantly internal"
records such as the BATF manual in Crooker.1 10 But this explanation
does not go far enough; "secret law" is not yet well-defined. To fill that

gap, courts should, perhaps, use an outcome-determinative test to disweight of the Senate Report because of the House Report's tarnished history: it was inserted only
after the Senate had passed the FOIA (although the House committee hearings had preceeded the
Senate's) and just as the House was prepared to report the bill favorably. See, e.g, K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.31 at 175-76 (1970 Supp.), cited in Crooker v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d at 1098 n.8 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Both Judge Wilkey's
Crooker dissent and his majority opinion in Jordan recount the legislative history. Each opinion
favors a narrow view of the exemption. See Id at 1096-1106; Jordan v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 766-69 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
107. The strongest of these factors are (1) the factual distinctions between Crooker and Jordan
(the records sought in the latter were guidelines for prosecutorial discretion) see Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc); (2) the
results in other circuits specifically addressing disclosure of BATF manuals, see id. at 1070-72; and
(3) the failure of the Supreme Court to foreclose a broad interpretation of Exemption 2 in relation
to law enforcement manuals in Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369 (1976),
cited in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d at 1066. In Rose the
Supreme Court approved of a narrow reading of Exemption 2 "at least where the situation is not
one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation." 425 U.S. at 369. This qualification seems to leave open the question faced in Croaker.
108. Judge Leventhal, whose theories are heavily relied on in Croaker, once observed that the
history of Exemption 2 is, at best, "confused" and "obscure." See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d
1136, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring). Thus, though Judge Wilkey's dissenting
opinion is appealing in calling for consistency in the law of the circuit instead of an entirely new
Exemption 2 test, it is less persuasive in its argument against the majority's interpretation of reasonableness because it, too, relies on the legislative history for much of its logic.
109. In discussing "predominant internality" the majority opinion simply states that "guidelines on prosecutorial discretion are instructions to agency personnel . . . on how to regulate
members of the public." On the other hand, the BATF manual "consists solely of instructions to
agency personnel. There is no attempt to modify or regulate public behavior only to observe it for
illegal activity." 670 F.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original). This distinction is inadequate because it
looks only at the agency's intent, and not at the effects of that intent. Cf. text accompanying note
110 infra (outcome-determinative test).
110. 670 F.2d at 1091-92 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also id. at 1076-77 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring); id at 1086-87 (Mikva, J., concurring).
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tinguish between "secret law" and "predominantly internal" matters.

Outcome-determinative tests have long been used in choice-of-law situations to distinguish substance from procedure,'
a distinction that
may parallel that of "secret law" and "internality."
Applied to Crooker and Jordan, an outcome-determinative test

would support the Crooker majority's conclusions. The decision not to
prosecute a case obviously determines its outcome; thus the written
guidelines commanding such decisions serve as "secret law." The

choice of a particular method of surveillance, on the other hand, does
not significantly determine the outcome of a case, because other law
enforcement tactics may produce the evidence on which any particular
result turns. Thus, a surveillance training manual is "predominantly
internal."
The majority opinion in Crooker itself, however, provides only "a
fuzzy standard" 1 2 according to Judge Wilkey's dissent. The District of

Columbia Circuit should heed this criticism and provide a clearer test
for Exemption 2 soon.

IV.

REVERSE

FOIA

AND EXEMPTION

4

In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown1 3 the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), not the FOIA, authorizes reverse
FOIA litigation '" 4 under Exemption 4.115 But "the Supreme Court did
not decide ... whether the judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act should be on the administrative record or de novo."1 1 6
Prior to Chrysler, most courts holding that the APA provided the
proper vehicle for review in reverse FOIA cases reviewed only the
111. See, eg., Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). York provides
the pure statement of the test: "The question is whether ... a statute concerns merely the manner
and the means by which a right ... is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of
substance. . ., namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation...?" 326 U.S. at 109.
112. 670 F.2d 1051, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Some of the
fuzziness in Crooker stems from acrimony between the judges, acrimony surfacing in the various
opinions. The District of Columbia Circuit has had a history of intermittent bickering, see The
D.C.Supercircuit, NATIONAL L. J. at 110 (March 30, 1981), and Crooker illustrates that this bickering may continue.
113. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see Comment, Developments Underthe
FOIA-1979, supra note 13, at 141-46; Note, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown: Seeking A Formulafor
Responsible Disclosure Under the FOJA, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 159 (1979).
114. A reverse FOIA suit is an action by a submitter of information to prevent subsequent
disclosure of the information to a requester under the FOIA.
115. 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979). Exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976), states that "trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential may be withheld."
116. General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1981).
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agency record. 117 Dicta in Chrysler, however, left open the possibility
of de novo review by referring to section 706(2)(F) of the APA, which
allows a court to set aside agency findings which are "unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the

reviewing court."' 18

Although no court has yet authoritatively determined when sec-

tion 706 should come into play," 9 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in the case of Worthington Compressors v.

Costle, 20 and its continuation on a petition for modification, Worthington Compressorsv. Gorsuch,' 2 ' implied that the choice between record
and de novo review may lie within trial court discretion in at least some

narrow situations. Under the pre-Chrysler law of the District of Columbia Circuit the reverse-FOIA disclosure of exempt material (a dis123
cretionary decision under the Act 122) required only record review.

The question of exempt status, however, was judged de novo.' 2 4 In

Worthington Compressors the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
adopted Exemption 4 as its standard for discretionary disclosures. This
eliminated any distinction in the standard of review to be applied, leaving exempt status as a legal question that could properly be decided by
the district court, 125 and thus allowing either the court or the EPA to
decide the disposition of the records de novo. The court of appeals
117. See, eg., cases cited in Campbell, Reverse Freedomof InformationAct Litigation, in THE
1981 EDITION OF LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 57, 63-64
(6th ed. C. Marwick 1980).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976), citedin Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1981).
See Braverman, Chrysler Corporation v. Brown: ProtectingBusiness Secrets in the '86s, 4 CORP.
L. REv. 23, 36 n.47 (1981); Note, ProtectingConfidentialBusinessInformationFrom FederalAgency
DisclosureAfter Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 109, 122 (1980).
. 119. In General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit did not reach the question directly. The court did note that the APA "contemplates a right of judicial review only after the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative appeals." If the "controlling rules" have changed before judicial review occurs, administrative
appeals have not been exhausted and the agency should request a remand for redetermination.
Id. at 299. This theory establishes one threshhold requirement--exhaustion of remedies-before
de novo review may be contemplated, even under section 706(2)(F), and is supported by the opinions of several other circuits. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 611 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1979);
General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 607 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Eckerd, 600 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1979).
120. 662 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
121. 668 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (petition for modification).
122. The exemptions of the FOIA authorize withholding; they do not require it: "Subsection
(b). .. represents the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive
Branch must have the option to keep confidential, fit so chooses." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80
(1973) (emphasis added).
123. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. See Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
125. Worthington Compressors v. Costle, 662 F.2d at 51.
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therefore left the district court "free to proceed in whatever manner it

finds appropriate"' 26 on remand and refused, when asked to modify its
position, to "prohibit the district court from determining that de novo
review is appropriate."' 27
The Worthington Compressors court also refined the legal test of
confidentiality under Exemption 4. The dispute, as outlined in Worth-

ington Compressorsv. Costle, concerned test results and designs of portable air compressors, information submitted to the EPA as required by
law.' 28 The manufacturers claimed the data was confidential and could
be withheld under Exemption

4.129

Under NationalParksand Conser-

vation Association v. Morton, 30 information has confidential status if
its disclosure would "impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future" or "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained."' 3 ' The EPA determined, however, that the potential for du-

plicative private testing through "reverse engineering" precluded confidential status for the compressor data. The district court also found this
possibility dispositive and upheld the agency's right to disclose the
32
information.
The court of appeals disagreed. Judge Wilkey, for the majority,
concluded that both the EPA and the district court failed to consider
126. Id
127. 668 F.2d at 1374 (petition for modification).
128. The materials were submitted pursuant to the Noise Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86
Stat. 1234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4912(a) (1976)).
129. The plaintiffs in Worthington also alleged that section 4912(b)(1) of the Noise Control
Act precluded disclosure. That provision states: "[a]ll information obtained. . . pursuant to subsection (a). . .which information contains or relates to a trade secret or other matter referred to
in section 1905 of title 18, shall be considered confidential for the purposes of that section." Pub.
L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4912 (1976)). Section 1905 refers to the Trade
Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), which provides a criminal penalty for a government official's
unlawful disclosure of information that "concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source
of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or
association." The Worthington Compressors court did not decide whether the Noise Control Act
and the Trade Secrets Act are identical in their prohibitions on disclosure, see 662 F.2d at 50 n.28;
whether the statute qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, id. at 55-56 nn.61 & 63; or whether the
Trade Secrets Act and Exemption 4 are coextensive, id. at 55 n.59.
130. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). NationalParks and Conservation (an Exemption 4 case)
involved a request for records of concession operations at national parks. The court remanded
with instructions.to develop the record further so the concessionaires could have an opportunity to
show that disclosure would prejudice their competitive position.
131. Id. at 770.
132. "The compressors are sold in commerce; anyone can buy or rent them; and by means of
reverse engineering anyone can duplicate the tests and therefore the product verification reports"
required by the EPA. Worthington Compressors v. Costle, 662 F.2d at 49 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Mem. Order at 3, reprintedin Joint App. at 290).
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adequately the competitive harm to the plaintiff as required by National
Parks.133 The court conceded that the NationalParks test addressed
the typical reverse FOIA lawsuit in which government disclosure is the
sole means by which a competitor can obtain the information. 34 In
order to encompass the slightly more difficult problem of reverse engineering, therefore, the court expanded the NationalParks test. Two
new sub-factors were added to the determination of competitive harm:
"(1) the commercial value of the requested information, and (2) the cost
of acquiring the information through other means."' 135 The district
court had deemed the information disclosable simply because, as the
agency record indicated, reverse engineering was technically possible
and disclosure thus "would not create new access to otherwise unavailable information."' 136 The appellate court replaced technical possibility
with commercial practicability in its two-part analysis of commercial
37
harm.'
The appellate decision also left to the lower court the choice of
applying the test itself or allowing the EPA to do so by way of further
138
remand. The agency objected to giving the lower court discretion,
but did not object to the new factors in the competitive-harm test itself.
There was little reason to challenge them. The Worthington Compressors expansion of the confidential-information standard under Exemption 4 does not violate the Supreme Court's mandate that FOIA
exemptions merit narrow construction.' 39 To the contrary, adherence
to a test of technical possibility could vitiate even the "trade secrets"
portion of Exemption 4.140 The commercial-practicability standard,
133. Because the law required product verification reports, no question arose whether their

disclosure would hamper the government's ability to secure such information in the future.
134. See, e.g., Arthur J. Doherty v. FTC, 1981-1 Trade Cas. 64,117 (D.D.C. 1981). In Doherty the requester sought access to a mailing list of Fedders Heat Pump owners compiled pursuant to a consent order between Fedders and the FTC on recall remedies. The court granted
summary judgment on the weight of testimony by a Fedders representative that: 1) industry practice kept customer lists confidential, 2) such lists have commercial value to competitors, and 3) the
present heat-pump market was highly competitive. Note how the FTC, having commanded the
compilation of the list, was the sole source for the requester to search in this situation.
135. 662 F.2d at 51 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 52. See generalo Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (information publicly disseminated or available from other sources
not within Exemption 4).
137. 662 F.2d at 51 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
138. Id at 52-53. See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
139. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1976).
140. The definition of "trade secret" in FOIA litigation is slightly more exact than the definition of "confidential commercial information." One explanation of the term is "[a]n unpatented,
secret, commercially valuable, plan, appliance, formula, or process, which is used for the making,
preparing, compounding, treating, or processing of articles or materials which are trade commodities." Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), ap-
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which places the burden of proving impracticability on the reverseFOIA plaintiff 41
seeking nondisclosure, sensibly explains the vague term
"confidential"' and may reduce unnecessary reverse-FOIA suits. 142
V.

THE FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTION

Exemption 3 allows nondisclosure of information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."1 43 In 1981, the Long v. Bureau of
Economic Ana Lis1' decision from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit appeared to resolve one of the most complex Exemption 3 disputes to date. But part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
peal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971), quoting United States ex rel Norwegian Nitrogen
Prods. v. United States Tarriff Comm., 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), rep'don other grounds,
274 U.S. 106 (1927).
The Worthington test may be necessary to counter an argument that, for instance, a chemical
formula is capable of reproduction given sufficient testing of a product and cannot, therefore, be
"secret" for purposes of the "trade secrets" definition.
141. The commercial-practicability standard is appropriate for confidential commercial information because the privacy interest in such information is less than the privacy interest in confidential information about individuals. Compare, for example, the effects of confidentiality as
defined in Worthington Compressors for commercial privacy with the effects of confidentiality
under Exemption 7(D). The availability of information from an outside source can destroy confidential FOIA protection for information submitted in the Exemption 4 situation. It cannot do so,
however, for confidential information submitted in the Exemption 7(D) (cl. 2) situation by a confidential source. See Radowich v. United States Attorney, 658 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1981), discussed
at note 216 infra. See also Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 491-92 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Pratt v. Webster, 508 F. Supp. 751, 760 (D.D.C. 1981). This differentiation between confidential commercial information and confidential private information is analagous to the distinction between commercial speech and private first amendment speech. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978) ("we have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject
to government regulation, and other varieties of speech").
142. Because the reverse-FOIA plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of commercial impracticability will usually require more thorough evidentiary development than that needed for the
question of whether a duplication of data is technically possible, such a plaintiff is more likely to
reexamine his reasons for seeking nondisclosure, and in so doing, is likely to weigh the costs of
litigation against the costs of disclosure. Furthermore, the plaintiffs increased chances of prevailing in such suits should be partially balanced by the deterrent effect of requesters not pursuing
such claims into the courts.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See note 44 supra for a text of the statute. Sometimes Exemption 3 suits do not, at first, seem to involve statutes. For instance, the District of Columbia
Circuit recently held that FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e) qualifies as a withholding statute for FOIA purposes. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Rule 6(e)(2)(a), providing a limited prohibition on disclosure of "matters occurring before the grand jury," was positively enacted by Congress, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(a), 91 Stat.
319 (1977); thus, Congress did not use the usual "layover" provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976).
Because of this method of enactment, rule 6(e), unlike most rules of procedure, is eligible as a
"statute." 656 F.2d at 867-68. Cf. Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) is not an appropriate basis for invocation of
Exemption 3 because it is not a statute).
144. 646 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 102 S.Ct. 468 (1981).
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(ERTA),1 4 5 immediately overruled the result.
Long involved section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides that certain tax return information must remain confidential.' 46 The 1976 amendment to section 6103, the "Haskell Amendment," adds that such return information does not, however, "include

or otherwise identify,
data in a form which cannot be associated with,
14 7
directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."

Relying on the Haskell Amendment, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that certain Internal Revenue Service Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data in the hands of the

Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) could not be withheld under the
FOIA. (TCMP data forms the statistical basis of the IRS's Discrimi-

nant Function scoring system for selecting returns for auditing. 148) The
BEA had edited its set of TCMP documents to delete taxpayers' names
and identification numbers.149 This left no material issue of fact as to
whether the TCMP records might still have had "possible indirect identifiers"; thus the court granted summary judgment for the Longs and
50
ordered disclosure.'
145. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 701(a), 95 Stat. 340 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 6103(b)).
146. Tax "return information" is defined in section 6103 as:
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data,
received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with
respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense, and
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document relating to
such written determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b)) which is not
open to public inspection under section 6110.
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) & (B). This helps make § 6103 specific enough to qualify as a § (b)(3)
withholding statute under the FOIA.
147. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B)(cL 2).
148. TCMP data consist of a random selection of taxpayers from whom the IRS then obtains
comprehensive audits. The IRS stores the audit information, including the amounts it considers
the taxpayer should have reported, in the form of checksheets and computer tapes. This data is
sorted by a weighting process under the DIF system, which attempts to identify returns with a
high potential for tax changes. Such returns are more likely to receive audits. Long v. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d at 1314 n.l.
149. The Longs discovered the existence of the edited BEA tapes while pursuing the sameunedited-information in a suit against the IRS. See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
150. Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d at 1320. The "indirect identifier" question arises from Haskell Amendment's standard for return information that may not be disclosed:
the standard does not include information that would not "directly or indirectly" identify a taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B). The formulation of the question in terms of indirect identification results from the tangled procedural history of the Long's TCMP litigation.
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At the BEA's request, the Supreme Court stayed disclosure to allow the Bureau time to petition for certiorari. During the delay, Presi-

dent Reagan secured passage of the ERTA. Section 701 of that Act
sought to moot the litigation over the TCMP data by changing the Haskell Amendment to Code section 6103 to read:
Nothing... in any. . provision of law, shall be construed to require the disclosure of standards used or to be used for the selection
of returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such standards, if the Secretary determines that such disclosure
will seriously impair assessment, collection, or enforcement under
the internal revenue laws.15 '
This statutory change is intended to qualify as an exempting law within
section (b)(3)(B) of the FOIA by establishing "particular criteria for
withholding" and by referring to "particular types of matters to be
withheld."1 52 The new amendment should easily meet the section
In an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 446

U.S. 917 (1980), the court held, on the basis of the Haskell Amendment, that section 6103 does not
categorically exempt all return information from disclosure: "[i]t is the clear purpose of section
6103 to protect the privacy of taxpayers. At the same time the amendment demonstrates a purpose to permit the disclosure of compilations of useful data in circumstances which do not pose
serious risks of a privacy breach." .d. at 368. The court also ordered a remand to determine
whether, once direct identifying data was deleted, "disclosure of TCMP source data [would entail]
a significant risk of indirect identification [of taxpayers]." Id. at 367.
Following the denial of certiorari in Long v. IRS, the district court allowed the IRS to amend
its complaint to raise additional defenses. The Longs then moved for summary judgment in Long
v. Bureau ofEconomic Analysis, in which, because of a failure by the government to e;ther amend
or consolidate the case with Long v. IRS and thereby gain additional defenses, the issue was
limited to the question of "indirect identifiers" raised in the prior holding of Long v. IRS.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment for the
Longs on this issue. The BEA had offered only conclusory allegations to rebut evidence that the
Bureau's TCMP tapes, which contained "no name or taxpayer identification number," Long v.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d at 1321, did not contain any data that might identify a
taxpayer. During oral argument, the agency's counsel even stated that the Bureau "had not yet
determined whether any such indirect identifier problem was present." Id.
The Long decisions have had an impact on other circuits. In Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661
(D.C. Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accepted the holding of
Long v. IRS in determining that correspondence between third parties and federal officials which
prompts the officials' later contacts with the IRS concerning the tax matters of the private third
parties may not be exempt under section 6103. The court stated:
It is conceivable that a taxpayer letter might contain some. . .[return] information...
for example, the "amount of his income," such that the disclosure of the letter would
pose no risk of identifying the taxpayer ifhisname and address were deleted. We do not
hold, however, that mere deletion of names and addresses removes all return information from the taxpayer letters. The District Court has discretion to determine what information, other than name and address, poses a risk of identifying a taxpayer and how
great that risk is.
Id. at 665 (emphasis in original). Accord, Moody v. IRS, 645 F.2d 795, 797-98 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
151. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 701(a), 95 Stat. 340 (1981) (to
be codified at I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B)).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1976).
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(b)(3)(B) standards. The general proposition, present elsewhere in sec-

tion 6103, allowing withholding of return information whenever the
Secretary determines disclosure would "seriously impair Federal tax
administration,"' 153 has withstood judicial review.' 54 Furthermore,

ERTA section 701 clearly represents a valid congressional "delegation
' 55
of authority to withhold information."'

Alternatively, ERTA section 701 could preempt the FOIA under
the rationale of Zale Corp. v. IRS,156 a 1979 district court case affirming an agency withholding of IRS materials. Zale held that I.R.C.
section 6103 (e)(6)'s highly particularized criteria, enacted shortly after
the 1976 FOIA amendments and similar to those of ERTA section
701,157 superseded the FOIA's disclosure criteria. 58 Either rationale
substantially frustrates the Long litigation' 59 and restricts access to IRS
60
information.'
VI. THE INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION

Although the IRS achieved an eventual victory in its Exemption 3
litigation through a congressional preemption of the controversy, 16 1 its
1981 Exemption 5162 experiences were less pleasant. Section (b)(5) of
the FOIA operates to "exempt those documents

. . .

normally privi-

153. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6).
154. See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842
(1979). See also Freuhauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
IRS, 493 F. Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980).
155. FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 265 (1975). Such delegation of authority is probative of proper Exemption 3 status.
156. 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979).
157. See text accompanying note 151 supra for the text of the ERTA provision. The current
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6), governing interested-party, internal and inter-agency disclosures of tax return
information, states: "Return information ... may be open to ... disclosure to any person authorized by this subsection to inspect any return of such taxpayer if the Secretary determines that
such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal tax administration."
158. 481 F. Supp. at 488-90. See Note, Developments Underthe FOIA-1980,supra note 13 at
365-67, for a discussion of Zale Corp. Several commentators have concluded the case was
wrongly decided. See, e.g., Note, Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: Turmoil in the
DisclosureSchemefor Tax Return Information, 30 CATH. U. L. REV.675 (1981); Comment, 69
GEO.L.J. 1283 (1981).
159. The Longs have the additional, non-legal problem of rapidly expiring research funding.
160. This highly specific success by the Reagan administration, chief sponsor of the ERTA
legislation, may foreshadow the eventual passage of more generally restrictive FOIA amendments. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra on S. 1730, the Reagan-Hatch FOIA amendments bill.
161. See text accompanying notes 151-60 supra.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976) permits withholding of "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
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leged in the civil discovery context,"' 63 including those covered by a
"governmental" or "deliberative process" privilege. Through these

privileges, Exemption 5 protects subjective, as opposed to factual, information and items that are predecisional, rather than incorporated
into or in explanation of a final agency decision. 1 64 In the first of 198 I's

most noteworthy Exemption 5 cases (all three of which involved the
IRS and were decided in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-

lumbia Circuit) the court applied this formula in favor of the IRS.
In Common Cause v. IRS16 5 the court reviewed a request for IRS
documents that discussed the agency's decision not to implement a plan

for public disclosure of contacts between high-ranking federal officials
and the IRS concerning tax problems of third parties. The plaintiffs
sought the text of the defunct disclosure plan, IRS memoranda discussing the plan, and logbooks of congressional contacts with the IRS. The
district court held the first two types of information exempt under
166
FOIA section (b)(5).

163. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). The word "normally" may be
emphasized. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (correct
standard is whether information would "routinely be disclosed" in private litigation). This emphasis prevailed in the 1981 case of Swisher v. Department of the Air Force, 660 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.
1981), denying the plaintitl's claim that a showing of exceptional need can overcome exemption
under FOIA § 552 (b)(5).
164. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973). See generaly 2 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW § 15.07 (1980). For an example of a
decision predicated on the factual versus subjective distinction, see Government Land Bank v.
GSA, No. CA 80-1203-T (D. Mass. June 26, 1981) (holding that an appraisal report of property
held by the GSA is more like factual data than not).
Other privileges incorporated by Exemption 5 include the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work-product privilege. Concerning the latter, see Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir.
June 8, 1981). The requester of information objected to the application of Exemption 5 to a
document detailing a meeting between an IRS lawyer and a federal judge presiding over a receivership. Opposing counsel had been excluded, allegedly in violation of the district court's rules
(Rule 4 of the RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DIST. CT. FOR THE S.D. OF TEXAS) and A.B.A.
ethical standards (MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 7-35
(1979)). Id. at 799. Appellee IRS admitted the conduct, and the court ordered a remand for
reconsideration of the document in question. The court cautioned, however, that "[n]o court
should order disclosure under the FOIA or in discovery if the disclosure would traumatize the
adversary process more than the underlying legal misbehavior." Id. at 801.
Exemption 5 does not, however, incorporate an equitable "settlement privilege" protecting
correspondence between the government and a private party concerning details of an unsuccessful
settlement effort. County ofMadison v. Department of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036 (Ist Cir. 1981). See
note 22 supra and accompanying text (settlement privilege may be legislated under new ReaganHatch bill).
165. 646 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
166. Common Cause v. IRS, 1980-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9208 at 83,325 (D.D.C. 1979), aj'd 646
F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1981) The court ordered disclosure of the logbooks, holding that they were
not within Exemption 5. Id.
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Common Cause's argument that the IRS memoranda were not
privileged because they explained a final IRS policy decision-the decision not to implement the disclosure plan-failed to convince the
court of appeals. Instead, the court held that the plan had remained
167
merely a proposal; its non-adoption did not make law or policy. Citing NLRB v. Sears,Roebuck & Co. ,168 the court noted: "The public is
only marginally concerned with reasons supporting a policy which an
169
agency has rejected."'
A "floodgates" rationale also surfaced in explanatory dicta:
The position urged by Common Cause, if pushed to its logical limits,
could virtually eliminate the governmental privilege. Every rejection
of a proposal, no matter how infeasible or insignificant, would become a "final decision" of an agency. True, the rejection of a policy
does embody a decision; but neither the language of Exemption 5 nor
the holding in Sears demands that such a narrow interpretation of
be adopted in order to protect the public
the governmental privilege
70
interest in disclosure.'
The floodgates analysis itself should not be pushed to its logical limits.
The Sears case involved an "agency's final, unappealable decision not
to pursue a judicial remedy in an adversarial dispute,"' 7 1 and the Court
forbade any withholding of memoranda explaining that decision. 172 In
contrast, Common Cause involved a "voluntary suggestion, evaluation,
and rejection of a proposed policy by an agency,"' 7 3 and the court
ruled that memoranda of that decision could be withheld. Various fact
situations between Sears and Common Cause may warrant more
favorable consideration of disclosure. For instance, indications that the
evaluation and rejection of a proposed policy proceeded under undue
174
outside influence or under ethically questionable circumstances
should forestall a blind application of the Common Cause rationale.
Shortly after the Common Cause decision, a different panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Taxation
with RepresentationFund v. IRS 75 and ordered disclosure of numerous
167. 646 F.2d at 659. On the basis of the decision in Common Cause, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit also denied the release of the memoranda to an economics professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
168. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
169. Id. at 152, citedin Common Cause v. IRS, 646 F.2d at 659.
170. 646 F.2d at 660.
171. Id. at 659. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1975).
172. 421 U.S. at 155.
173. Common Cause v. IRS, 646 F.2d at 659.
174. See Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (work-product privilege possibly vitiated by attorney misconduct), discussed at note 164 supra.
175. 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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IRS General Counsel's Memoranda (GCMs), Technical Memoranda
(TMs), and Actions on Decisions (AODs). In support of disclosure the
court theorized that these documents constituted part of the "working

law" of the IRS and thus did not qualify for the "deliberative process"
privilege of Exemption 5.176 Three factors determined "working law"
status. First, if documents either reflect a final decision or are postdecisional, they constitute "working law," 177 Second, if they have a

significant function in the agency's decision process, for example, as
precedent or legislative history applied in dealings with the public, they
are "working law."' 78 Finally, if they flow from a superior official with
to a subordinate, they are more likely to be
policy-making authority
179
"working law."'

Most of the GCMs, TMs, and AODs fit within one or more of
these categories. 80 Consequently, the Taxation Fund court ordered
disclosure, but the court limited its order to those GCMs and TMs
adopted and distributed within the IRS and to those AODs that recommended no appeal.18 1 The circuit court remanded the case to allow the
district court to determine whether AODs recommending appeal are
176. Id. at 678. The court cites NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 152-54 (citations
and footnotes omitted):
[T]he public is vitally concerned with the reasons which did supply the basis for an
agency policy actually adopted. These reasons, if expressed within the agency, constitute
the 'working law' of the agency.. . . This conclusion is powerfully supported by the
other provisions of the Act. The affirmative portion of the Act, expressly requiring indexing of "final opinions," "statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency," and "instructions to staff that affect a member of the public," 5
U.S.C. § 522(a)(2), represents a strong congressional aversion to "secret [agency] law"
...
and represents an affirmative congressional purpose to require disclosure of documents which have "the force and effect of law.".., We should be reluctant, therefore,
to construe Exemption 5 to apply to the documents described in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2);
we hold that Exemption 5 can never
and with respect at least to "final opinions" .
apply.
177. 646 F.2d at 677.
178. Id. at 678-79.
179. Id. at 681.
180. GCMs, written originally to guide the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) on substantive issues in various rulings, receive constant updating to reflect the General Counsel's position
on these issues. This makes them both post-decisional and representative of a superior's policy
commands. See id. at 682-83. GCMs are an integral part of IRS decisionmaking. The IRS indexes and widely distributes the GCMs to its staff, which uses them as interpretative guides, as
case precedents for future GCMs, and as legal research tools. See id. at 682-83. TMs "may be
fairly equated with 'legislative history' accompanying a new statute," id. at 683, because they
explain proposed Treasury decisions or regulations. When a regulation or decision is adopted,
TMs are usually filed and are then used in much the same way as GCMs. Id. AODs recommending no appeal from court decisions against the IRS are treated by the agency as final legal
determinations and include the rationale for the agency's position. Id. at 684. Such AODs present precisely the same situation as in Sears, in which the Court ordered disclosure of NLRB
documents linked with that agency's decision not to appeal. See 421 U.S. at 152.
181. Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d at 682-84.
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either final decisions or decisions on which the IRS staff would rely in
decisionmaking. Either of these characteristics would tend to classify
AODS as "working law."1 82 On the other hand, GCMs and TMs never
adopted or distributed within the IRS are like the proposed, but never
adopted, IRS policy in Common Cause, and for similar reasons those
GCMs and TMs remain privileged.
Some eight months later, the Taxation Fund panel reemphasized
this last point in Pies v. IRS.183 Pies claimed that while drafting regulations as an attorney for the IRS he incorporated "significant portions" of certain proposed regulations into another regulation which
was eventually adopted.1 8 4 Later, in private practice, he sought copies
of the proposed regulations under the FOIA. The court held, however,
that Pies' incorporation of the proposed regulations into another regulation was insufficient reason to treat the proposed regulations as reflecting agency law. 185 The Pies court emphasized that the proposals
"were never subjected to final review, never approved by the officials
having authority to do so, and never approved within the Legislation
86
and Regulations Division."'
Bounded by the principles of Common Cause and Pies, the Taxation Fund decision nevertheless represents greatly enhanced access to
certain agency records. Lawyers and the general public highly value
such agency documents as GCMs, TMs, and AODs because these documents may suggest how best to conform with the law or how best to
87
attack it.1
VII.

THE PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS

Congressional concern for personal privacy underlies both Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C). The former permits withholding of "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 88 The
182. Id at 681.
183. 1981-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 9758 at 88,528 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1981).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.See also Common Cause v. IRS, 646 F.2d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1981): "casual allusion
in a post-decisional document to subject matter discussed in same pre-decisional, intra-agency
memoranda is not the express adoption or incorporation by reference which... would remove
the protection of Exemption 5 if the memorandum were the agency's 'final opinion."'
187. Prentice-Hall will soon begin publishing a service containing GCMs, TMs, and AODs
released by the IRS pursuant to the consent order approved by the district court handling the
remand of Taxation with Representation Fund. The order itself is in Tax Analysts v. IRS, 48
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) § 6175, vacatedand new orderto similareject substituted 49 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H)
§ 421 (D.D.C. 1981).
188. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
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latter exempts "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes... to the extent that the production of such records would
.. . constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 89 Once
the threshold requirements of "similar file" status for Exemption 6 and
"investigatory record" status for Exemption 7(C) have been met, both
exemptions require a test balancing personal privacy with the public
interest in disclosure. 190
The preliminary determination that records constitute "similar
files" also involves a comparative analysis. This process compares the
privacy interest in records of the type sought to be withheld to the privacy interest in personnel and medical records. A recent and widely
cited definition restates this process: the information in "similar files"
must be "of the same magnitude-as highly personal or as intimate in
nature-as that at stake in personnel and medical records."''
In Kurzon v. Department of Health and Human Services 192 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held this test applicable whenever a case seems to favor nondisclosure. 9 3 This requirement aids a
judge in focusing on "the type of privacy interest Congress had in
mind" (the point of the "similar files" comparison) "before weighing
that interest against the public interest in disclosure" (the point of the
"unwarranted invasion of privacy" comparison).194 The Kurzon court
found the privacy interest in names and addresses of unsuccessful applicants for National Cancer Institute research grants unlike the privacy interest in personnel and medical files. Thus, because the
applicant information did not constitute "similar files," the court did
not need to apply the balancing test of a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of privacy.195
The "similar files" comparison, because it focuses on types of privacy interests, appears outwardly less rigorous and thus more flexible
189. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976).
190. Concerning Exemption 6, Congress noted in legislative history that "[t]he phrase 'clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of
interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to government information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). See also H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprIntedin [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.

191. Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 627 F.2d 392, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
192. 649 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1981).
193. Id. at 67.
194. Id.
195. The court expressed some relief at avoiding that second step: "in cases where the lack of
similarity proves dispositive, addressing that issue first avoids the difficulties inherent in attempting to balance meaningfully widely disparate interests." Id.
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than the specific balancing test of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy." This perception of flexibility may lead some courts to make
indirect comparisons when applying the former test. Rather than comparing the files at issue to personnel and medical files specifically, such
courts may compare the files at issue to records previously found to be
similar or dissimilar to personnel and medical files. For example, in
Washington Post Co. v. United States Departmentof State the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not compare the privacy interest of Iranian residents in records of United States citizenship
and passport status to the privacy interest in medical and personnel
fies directly, but to the privacy interest in records including dates of
naturalization. 196 In an earlier case, Simpson v. Vance, 197 the court had
denied "similar files" status to records including naturalization dates.
Thus, because "the facts of current citizenship or possession of a
United States passport are no more personal than dates of naturalizado not qualtion held nonexempt in Simpson.. .the files in question
198
ify under the first facet of the Exemption 6 test."'
This analysis potentially alters the protection of personal privacy
afforded by Exemption 6.199 It requires a requester merely to show that
the information sought under the FOIA is like some other records once
found dissimilar to personnel or medical records. Once this is established, the information sought would also be regarded as dissimilar and
unprotected by Exemption 6. The specific language of the FOIA, how196. See 647 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 565 (1981), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W.
4522 (U.S. May 17, 1982). See note 201 infra.
197. 648 F.2d 10, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
198. 647 F.2d at 199. Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion relies on Simpson completely: "I
recognize... that Simpson states the law of this circuit on the issue. Because of this, and only
because of this, I now concur." Id. at 200 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
199. It is incorrect to conceive of either the generic "similar files" measure of privacy or the
specific "clearly unwarranted invasion" measure of privacy as wholly encompassing the other. Cf.
United States Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4522, 4524 n.4 (U.S. May
17, 1982) (Justice Rehnquist maintains a similar position on the basis that "similar files" could not
include information files not related to any particular person even though release of such files
might cause embarassment to some persons generally.). An admittedly technical example illustrates this point: an employee of the General Accounting Office is suspected of embezzlement, a
suspicion formally recorded by his superior in daily personnel records. The superior's formal
acknowledgement triggers an FBI investigation. The investigation concludes without either clearing or condemning the employee. Now, the same privacy-threatening information, the suspicion
of embezzlement, appears in two files. The potential invasion of privacy from the disclosure of
either file may be the same. But the investigatory fies, in contrast to the personnel files, should
not be withheld under Exemption 6 because they are not "similar fies." Whether they could be
withheld under Exemption 7 is another question. See generally text accompanying notes 202-24
infra. This example shows only that the "similar files" test has some independent conceptual
identity and should not be treated as if its terms are unimportant; the test may determine disclosure. See also note 201 infra (Court's reversal of Washington Post).
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ever, implies that the privacy interest in the information sought must be
measured against the privacy interest in personnel and medical files,

not against the privacy interest in other similar or dissimilar files. 20 0
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Washington Post case,

and thus has an opportunity to implement the FOIA's statutory language by determining the status of the citizenship and passport infor-

mation at issue through a direct comparison to the privacy interest in
20 1
the medical and personnel files the Act specifies.
200. This is important because the privacy interest in personnel and medical files may change
much more slowly than, for instance, the privacy interest in some other kind of file that was once
found similar to personnel and medical fies. Measuring privacy against the information in a
once-similar file which may now be viewed as public data could result in disclosure of information
that is still similar to that contained in medical files.
The Simpson decision on which the Washington Post opinion is based also fails to recognize
the potential for differences in privacy values, differences which may be geographic as well as
temporal. The Simpson court stated that one reason for denying Exemption 6 treatment to the
State Department information contained in the BiographicRegister is "the fact that similar information, until 1975, had been placed in the public domain by the Department. That practice was
allegedly stopped not to prevent further disgrace or embarrassment to the individuals, but on the
ground that it might deter threats of physical harm from terrorists ....
" 648 F.2d at 14. Threats
of physical harm may be as good an indication of an unwarranted invasion of privacy as embarrassment in some situations. Simpson fails to measure invasions of privacy in terms of time and
geography. Invasion of privacy should be measured at the time of the proposed disclosure as
compared to the contemporaneous privacy interest in medical or personnel records. The place in
relation to which the invasion of privacy should be measured is the situs of the records rather than
the litigant's domicile. In most instances, the situs of the records will be the United States. If
privacy were measured by the location of the person referred to in the records, that person could
defeat FOIA requests by moving. The reasonable limits of the Exemption should not require
extensive hypothetical analysis of future privacy conditions, or of privacy conditions in remote
locales. The Simpson court could have explained why terrorist threats were not necessarily any
indication that the information revealed was highly private. The implicit answer is that the
breach of a current privacy interest in personnel and medical files in the United States does not
usually give rise to such threats, even though such threats might arise in another country.
201. As this comment went to press, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist that paid
little heed to the concept of "similar files" as distinguished from the concept of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." See 50 U.S.L.W. 4522 (U.S. May 17, 1982). The Court
could have measured the current privacy interest in citizenship information in the United States
against the current privacy interest in medical and personnel file information in the United States,
rather than comparing the possible interests in United States citizenship information in Iran with
such possible interests in personnel and medical files in Iran. The Court could thereby find the
information disclosable under the FOIA. Cf. note 200 supra.
As Judge Lumbard noted in his Washington Post concurrence, naturalization and citizenship
information already "is a matter of public record on file in various federal district courts across the
country." 647 F.2d at 199 (Lumbard, J., concurring). In the United States, medical and personnel
files, unlike citizenship and naturalization data, do not usually comprise matters of public record.
Thus the citizenship fies do not seem to meet the "similar files" requirement.
But the Court chose instead to construe Exemption 6 very broadly, supporting its decision
with references in the legislative history of the FOIA to a "general exemption" for the "kind of
files the disclosure of which might harm the individual." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4523, quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966). Unfortunately, this again occludes the distinction be-
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The "file" question in Exemption 7 raises similar difficulties.
Courts must decide both whether records are "investigatory" and
whether they are "compiled for law enforcement purposes. ' 20 2 Exemption 7(C) also parallels Exemption 6 in its second step, the determination of "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. '20 3 The omission
of the word "clearly" in the 7(C) requirement, however, "provide[s]
somewhat broader protection for privacy interest . . . than normally
afforded under Exemption 6."204 Courts have made use of this distinction as a tool for deciding Exemption 7(C) suits during 1981.
In Ferri v. Bell 20 5 the plaintiff sought information including the
arrest records of witnesses at his previous trial on federal criminal
charges. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, while holding
that such "rap sheets" are not "similar files" for Exemption 6 purposes,20 6 held them to be "investigatory records" within Exemption
7.207 Because an agency can use a lesser showing of privacy to justify a
7(C) withholding than an Exemption 6 withholding, 20 the plaintiff had
to show a strong public interest in disclosure, as well as prove that the
privacy interest actually was not especially strong. He succeeded in
tween the specific and the generic made in the Act. Even the quoted legislative history refers to
"kind of files," a generic requirement. Passport status files are not-generically--the kind which,
if disclosed, cause a severe invasion of privacy the way medical files-generically-do. The confusion of the generic and the specific occurs throughout Rehnquist's opinion. For example, in
stating the decision below, he notes that the court of appeals found the citizenship status of the
persons in question less intimate than the information in personnel and medical files. Id. More
properly, the court of appeals found all files of citizenship status generally less intimate than all
medical and personnel files. See 642 F.2d at 199. The Court's decision does not represent any
staggering blow to information disclosure. The Justices, all of whom agreed with the decision,
merely simplified the application of Exemption 6. But simplification does not, perhaps, serve the
purposes of an Act which invites strict construction of its terms as the best way to effect its goal of
openness.
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
203. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exemption 7(C) was part of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, Pub.
L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1563 (1974). The language of Exemption 6 has remained unaltered
since the passage of the original FOIA in 1966.
204. Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856
(D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976);
Bast v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d
1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1981); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1136 n.7 (4th Cir. 1977);
Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 541 (D.D.C.
1977). This distinction between Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) makes sense: the information
in medical and personnel files is usually voluntarily supplied by the person whose privacy is
threatened by the disclosure of the fies, unlike the information contained in most investigatory
records.
205. 645 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1981).
206. Id. at 1217.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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both. Reasoning that Paul v, Davis 20 9 permits deliberate mass circulation of arrest information, 210 the court decided any privacy interest in
arrest records can certainly "be outweighed if Ferri demonstrates a

public benefit to be served thereby." 21 1 To demonstrate that such a
public interest existed, the court alluded to the rule of Brady v. Mary-

land212 that a criminal defendant may seek a new trial if the prosecution fails to inform him of information that may not otherwise arise
and that provides reasonable doubt of guilt.213 Thus, "to the extent this
disclosure may remedy and deter Brady violations, society stands to
2 15
gain" '2 14 and withholding becomes unwarranted.
The court in Ferri identified a narrow and specific public protection granted by the criminal justice process to support the invasion of
privacy contemplated by disclosure. In contrast, without such a specific
public protection, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit refused to invade the privacy of even public figures in Fundfor
2 16
ConstitutionalGovernment v. NationalArchivesandRecords Service.
The Fundfor Constitutional Government case involved a request for
documents, most of which were eventually released, generated by the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force. The district court allowed a
withholding under Exemption 7(C) of any information which disclosed
the participants in unindicted wrongdoings or which revealed the iden2 17
tities of confidential sources or third parties not under investigation.
209. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
210. Id. at 712-13.
211. Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d at 1218.
212. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
213. Id. at 86-87.
214. Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d at 1218.
215. Cf. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (Exemption 7(C) does not authorize withholding from the news media routine information such as age,

address, marital status, and employment status of persons arrested or indicted).
216. 656 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
217. Id. at 861 (paraphrasing Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records
Serv., 485 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1978), modfed, 656 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The withhold-

ing, allowing for information that would reveal the identities of confidential sources, could also
have been justified under Exemption 7(D); indeed the district court used Exemption 7(D) as an
alternate ground for its decision. See 485 F. Supp. at 9; ef.Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002

(7th Cir. 1977); Church of Scientology v. Department of State, 493 F. Supp. 418, 421-22 (D.D.C.
1980); Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (in all three cases Exemption
7(C) was applied to protect identity of sources). Exemption 7(D) applies to those investigatory
records whose disclosure would reveal "the identity of a confidential source" or, in the case of a
criminal or national security investigation, would reveal "confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976). The leading Exemption 7(D) case in
1981, Radowich v. United States Attorney, 658 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1981), held that agency records
revealing the identity of a confidential source may be withheld despite a public knowledge of the
source's identity derived through means other than the FOIA. As the court noted, "the proscription of involuntary disclosure. . . does not disappear if the 'identity' of the 'confidential source'
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The court of appeals began its review by a comparison of the pri-

vacy interests at issue with Exemption 6 presumptions of privacy invasion: "that an individual's name appears in [personnel, medical, or

similar] files... will probably not engender comment and speculation,
while... an individual whose name surfaces in connection with an

investigation may, without more, become the subject of rumor and innuendo. ' 218 The comparison tends to support the court's critical con-

clusion that information concerning a criminal investigation falls
within Exemption 7(C) 219 rather than Exemption 6.
Reference to Exemption 6 also illustrates why an Exemption 7(C)
presumption of privacy may be difficult to overcome: though Exemp220
tion 6 "instructs the court to tilt the balance in favor of disclosure,"
Exemption 7(C) provides only the impetus of de novo review against
unqualified withholdings. 22' Without a tilt in favor of disclosure, for
example, the public-figure status of persons identified in the records

sought cannot alone defeat a withholding. 222 As the Fundfor Constitutional Government court implies, additional circumstances are needed:

"We might be persuaded under appropriate circumstances that an individual's status as a 'public figure' would tip the 7(C) balance in favor of
later becomes known but continues until the beneficiary of the promise of confidentiality waives
disclosure." Id. at 960. Furthermore, the court held that all information furnished by a confidential source in the course of a criminal or national-security investigation remains exempt from
mandatory disclosure whether the same information which is not from a confidential source must
be, or has been, disclosed. .d. at 959, 960, 964.
218. Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d at 863
(quoting Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 541
(D.D.C. 1977)).
219. Id. at 863. Disclosing the mere connection of an individual with a criminal investigation
does not present an unwarrantedinvasion of privacy in every circumstance. See id. at 866; Lame
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 923 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981). But the presumption is a
strong one: "release of this type of information represents a severe intrusion on the privacy interests of the individuals in question and should yield only where exceptional interests militate in
favor of disclosure." 656 F.2d at 866. Courts tend to favor the privacy interest once it is established with sufficient clarity. See, e.., Bast v. United States Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Common Cause v. National Archives and Records Serv., 628 F.2d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Librach v. FBI, 587 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1980), ajf'dmem., 656 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
220. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
221. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 n.16; Bast v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
222. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d at
865; Common Cause v. National Archives and Records Serv., 628 F.2d at 179, 184 (D.C. Cir.
1980). As one specialized application of this principle, government officials do not, by virtue of
their positions alone, forfeit their personal privacy under the FOIA. See Baez v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d
472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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disclosure. This is not, however, such a case. ' 223 The court speaks of
public figure status as "diminish[ing] an individual's interest in privacy. ' 224 It is conceptually simpler, however, to regard public-figure
status as increasing the public interest in disclosure. When this in-

creased public interest coincides with, for instance, any identifiable
public protection specified by law, then "appropriate circumstances"
may exist for tipping the balance in favor of disclosure.225
The court could find no identifiable public protection in Fundfor
ConstitutionalGovernment. This, coupled with the initially higher bar-

rier to disclosures in Exemption 7(C) cases as compared to Exemption
6 cases, led to an affirmance of the Fundfor ConstitutionalGovernment
withholdings. The relative threat of damage to individual Iranian residents from disclosure in The Washington Post may seem much higher
than the threat of damage to individual government officials already
investigated during the Watergate scandal in Fundfor Constitutional
Government. But the scheme of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) provides dif-

ferent levels of privacy, and these different disclosure results do not
necessarily conflict.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A number of positive steps to clarify the FOIA occurred in 1981.
The District of Columbia Circuit's improved test for confidentiality
under Exemption 4 in Worthington Compressors was one such step.
223. Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 865
(D.C. Cir. 1981). The court also noted that "the legitimate and substantial privacy interests of
individuals under these circumstances cannot be overriden by a general public curiosity." .d. at
866. See also Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (D.D.C. 1980), af'dmem., 656 F.2d
900 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
224. Fund for Constitutional Government v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d
at 865.
225. See e.g., Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp.
538 (D.D.C. 1977) (protection from campaign contribution abuses under what was then the Federal Corrupt Practices Act plus public-figure status of recipient warrants disclosure of information
regarding contribution). An identifiable public protection alone may tip the balance in favor of
disclosure. See Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213 (protection from Brady violations) (for a discussion of
Ferri,see text accompanying notes 204-14 supra); Bast v. Department of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (protection of public from judicial partiality when an identifiable instance of
judicial partiality exists).
In Bast, the requester of information alleged that a judge had improperly deleted part of an
open-court record during a previous FOIA trial in which Bast had been a party. The Department
of Justice and the FBI investigated on charges of obstruction ofjustice. Bast was denied access to
the records of that investigation under Exemption 7(C), except for a three-sentence passage segregated by the appellate court on in camera review. In the passage, an FBI agent attributes remarks
to the judge that can be read to indicate the judge had a bias toward the government in the trial
that sparked Bast's complaint. The court ordered disclosure of the passage holding that the "public importance of judicial impartiality" outweighed the judge's privacy interest. d. at 1256.
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That circuit's decision on IRS memoranda in Taxation with Representation Fund improved understanding of Exemption 5. And the legislative
action of the Reagan administration and Congress, in response to the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, foreclosed another area of uncertainty, that concerning Exemption 3's application to section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The standards of review and the uses of in camera examinations
for Exemption 1 litigation were not, however, conclusively determined.
Judge Wilkey's approach in Military Audit Project and Phillopi deserves critical inquiry. Worse, the District of Columbia Circuit's reversal of Exemption 2 theories in Crooker v. BureauofAlcohol, Tobacco, &
Firearms sheds no light on the continuing split among the circuits on
the question of that exemption's scope.
Beneath these uncertainties in the current law of the FOIA, the
new legislative initiatives to amend the Act created increasing pressures
to alter the Act's effects. Though FOIA supporters may prevent the
most drastic changes proposed in Congress during 1981,226 the changes
in the field of federal information disclosure that will occur in 1982
should prove as unpredictable as were the changes in 1981.
ChristopherM Mason
226. See note 27 supra.

